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HATE SPEECH AND HARASSMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
CAMPUS CODES THAT PROHIBIT RACIAL INSULTS
Alan E. Brownstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
Determining the constitutionality of campus regulations that restrict the
expression of hate speech is a particularly difficult undertaking because the
form and content of what may be reasonably regarded as hate speech, and
the circumstances in which hate speech may occur, vary significantly.' Yet
all of these conditions must be defined with some precision in order to
understand exactly what speech is to be prohibited and whether that
prohibition violates the First Amendment. The purpose of this Article is
narrowly limited to address only one discrete issue in the hate speech
controversy. Identifying even that single issue, however, will require
considerable background explanation and analysis.
Regulations restricting hate speech can be divided into two categories,
each of which is defined in functional terms. One category includes laws
designed to prevent the insidious message of hate propaganda from directly
or indirectly influencing the beliefs, attitudes, and ultimately, the actions
of the speakers' audience. The other category involves regulations intended
to protect individual members of victimized groups from being verbally
abused by racist or sexist epithets and insults. This dichotomy oversimpli-
fies the range and objectives of hate speech restrictions, but it has
considerable utility for the purposes of this Article in limiting the subject
of discussion.
Commentators do not always use the same language in describing the
regulations that fall roughly in the first category. David Strauss talks about
prohibiting speech that will "persuade those who hear it to do something
* Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.A., 1969, Antioch College; J.D.,
1977, Harvard University. The author wishes to thank A. Wayne MacKay, James
Weinstein, Leon Trakman, and Kevin Johnson for reading drafts of this Article and for
providing helpful criticism. I also want to thank Lea Schuster for her work as a research
assistant on this project.
See, e.g., UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). For
examples of actual and hypothetical applications of campus hate speech codes, see also
James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate Speech,
38 WAYNE L. REV. 163 (1991).
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of which the government disapproves."2 Calvin Massey describes attempts
to purify the "dialogue of public discourse . . . in which we decide,
collectively, who we are, what our values are, and what ends we will
pursue." 3
Notwithstanding these differences, the common foundation of laws in
this first category is relatively clear. In the context of hate speech, these
are regulations directed at public expression that attributes vile characteris-
tics to ethnic minority groups. At issue is speech about black people, for
example, and the effect of such speech on the community's attitudes
toward black people. It is almost universally recognized that laws of this
kind raise particularly acute constitutional problems and violate current
First Amendment doctrine.'
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate the constitutionality of laws
in the second category. The focus is on "wounding words . . . spoken
directly to the victim ... [where] there is little chance that any persuasion
is occurring,"' on "non-public discourse," 6 on "targeted vilification"
in "face-to-face encounters" where the "aim is to wound and
humiliate."7 The problem that laws in this category seek to address is the
harm to the individual that results when, in a university setting, a white
bigot walks up to a black student and uses racial epithets to insult her
while she is walking to class.
Two university hate speech codes attempting to prohibit targeted
abusive speech causing individual harm have been challenged as violating
the First Amendment and struck down by federal courts. In both cases,
Doe v. University of Michigan8 and UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents
2 David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 334, 334 (1991).
3 Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigm
of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L. REV. 103, 113 (1992).
4 See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985);
Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
' See Strauss, supra note 2, at 343.
6 See Massey, supra note 3, at 113, 150-52. Massey does not describe the parameters
of non-public or private discourse, but he does identify the "derision of one's fellow
employee in ... racially offensive terms" as falling within this category. Id. at 151. It
should be clear that the public-private speech distinction is not based exclusively on the
number of individuals to whom expression is directed, although that is certainly an
important factor to consider. Public speech can be addressed to a single individual. For
example, when a constituent attempts to persuade a member of Congress to vote against
a pending bill, the site of the conversation may be private, but the speech is public
discourse for First Amendment purposes.
7 Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L.
REV. 287, 306 (1990).
8 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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of the University of Wisconsin,9 the codes were held to be vague and over-
broad.' Significantly, however, each court approached the vagueness and
overbreadth issue from a different perspective.
In the University of Michigan case, the court identified a wide variety
of kinds of speech, and situations in which speech was used to cause
individual harm, that could be regulated without violating the First
Amendment. These included, for example, "the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting words,' those [words]
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace," speech "sufficient to state a claim for common law
intentional infliction of emotional distress," and "threats of violence or
property damage made with the specific intent to harass or intimidate the
victim."" The university's hate speech code was overbroad because it
was not limited to restricting these kinds of speech, but also prohibited
speech that the university disagreed with because of the "ideas or
messages sought to be conveyed." 12 Thus, the university had violated the
First Amendment by attempting to punish persuasive speech as well as
abusive speech that caused harm to targeted individuals.
In the University of Wisconsin case, on the other hand, the court
displayed a much more rigid and limited perspective with regard to the
range of permissible speech regulations. In its view, virtually all persuasive
speech, and most harmful speech directed at individuals, were immune
from governmental sanction. Indeed, the only speech the university could
constitutionally prohibit that the court recognized was a narrowly defined
class of fighting words, speech that "by its very utterance tend[s] to incite
violent reaction.'' 3 No other abusive and harmful speech targeted at an
individual student could be punished.
The problem with the decisions of both of these courts is that the First
Amendment standard that they apply to campus hate speech codes seems
strangely divorced from conventional, real world restrictions on harmful
speech. The University of Wisconsin decision is particularly vulnerable to
this charge. Even a casual examination of state law in almost any
jurisdiction demonstrates a wide range of speech regulations that cannot
be defended as limited restrictions on "fighting words." Obscene phone
9 774 F. Supp. 1166 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
1o UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1168-81; Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 864-67.
Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 862-63.
12 Id. at 863.
"3 UWM Post, Inc., 774 F. Supp. at 1172. The court rejected all other asserted grounds
for restricting hate speech, repeatedly noting that these justifications exceeded the scope
of the fighting words doctrine. Id. at 1172-78.
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calls, which are almost never technically obscene, 4 abusive slurs and
vicious practical jokes that constitute intentional infliction of emotional
distress, 5 threats and verbal harassment,1 6 and bigoted expression in the
workplace are all subject to civil or criminal sanction. 7 Either the First
Amendment tolerates restrictions on far more than fighting words, or the
federal and state courts are exceedingly tolerant of laws that violate the
First Amendment.
The court in the University of Michigan case recognizes the potential
breadth of these conventional speech restrictions. It fails, however, to
explain why the same vagueness and overbreadth concerns that required
the invalidation of the university's hate speech code do not justify
invalidating most of these limitations on speech as well. It may be that
such laws survive constitutional scrutiny because courts recognize that
there is no way to define obscene phone calls or the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress with clarity and precision. That suggestion,
however, does not explain why a similar rationale cannot be used to justify
hate speech regulations.
The critical issue in reviewing university hate speech regulations, not
adequately considered by either the Michigan or the Wisconsin court, is
whether there is some principled way to defend the constitutionality of
these generally accepted restrictions on speech that target an individual for
abuse. The narrow fighting words principle adopted by the Wisconsin
District Court, although it is grounded on United States Supreme Court
precedent, 8 is too under-inclusive to be practical and is conceptually
unsatisfying. It is impractical because it only applies to face-to-face
14 See, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (stating
that the use of the term "obscene" in telephone harassment statutes refers to language
that is offensive to one's feelings or to prevailing notions of decency, not to language that
meets the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity).
'5 See, e.g., Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123 (1990) (describing numerous
intentional infliction of emotional distress cases in which the victim was not in a position
to retaliate with physical violence); Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First
Amendment: An Analysis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 423, 463-66 (1988).
16 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (stating that a law prohibiting
threats of violence against the President is constitutional on its face); Bachowski v.
Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533 (Wis. 1987) (upholding the application of an anti-harassment
statute to expressive activity).
17 See, e.g., Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094, 1098-99 (2d Cir. 1986); Katz v.
Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983).
1" See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). For a more current
discussion of "fighting words" as a category of unprotected speech, see R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, Minn., 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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encounters that are likely to result in an immediate breach of the peace. 9
Thus, harassing and obscene phone calls could not be proscribed pursuant
to its authority since the frequent anonymity of the caller and the distance
between the offending speaker and his victim preclude immediate violent
retaliation in most instances. 20 The fighting words principle is unsatisfying
because it tolerates the victimization of the weak, of people who are incap-
able of protecting themselves from verbal abuse by threatening a physical
response.21 In ignoring the harm to the victims of invidious speech, the
fighting words principle seems to be directed at a tangent to the core
problem, without addressing what is most unacceptable about hate speech.
One alternative approach to resolving this problem is to define more
expansively the kind of expression that falls within the category of fighting
words. There is obvious precedent for this approach because Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire,22 the case in which the' fighting words doctrine
originated, did not exclusively limit this category of unprotected speech to
language that will immediately provoke a breach of the peace. Instead,
harmful words "which by their very utterance inflict injury," such as
epithets or personal abuse, were also recognized as being subject to
23
sanction.
A principle suggesting that all hurtful speech directed at an individual
might be prohibited would make too much speech vulnerable to restriction,
however, as cases decided after Chaplinsky have demonstrated. 24 The First
Amendment clearly protects stinging rebukes and angry criticism directed
at individuals despite the pain that such comments may cause. Thus, the
broader description of fighting words in Chaplinsky represents relevant
authority supporting the regulation of hurtful expression, but the question
of determining precisely when hurtful speech can be constitutionally
restricted remains an open issue requiring additional analysis.
The first step in addressing that question is to recognize that probably
no single principle can explain and justify all the legitimate and
permissible restrictions on harmful speech that exist. In the following
19 See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (stating that the fighting
words doctrine identifies as unprotected speech only those "words that have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed").
20 See infra note 56.
2! See Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 297-98.
22 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
23 Id. at 572; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940).
24 See, e.g., Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524-26; Massey, supra note 3, at 159 n.237 (arguing
that post-Chaplinsky cases "confine [the] fighting words doctrine to instances where
immediate violence is the likely product of the words in question"); see also Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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pages, I will argue that there are four factors that, in appropriate com-
binations, should be used by courts to uphold speech regulations designed
to protect individuals from abusive expression directed at them. An
evaluation of these factors, in turn, will determine the constitutionally
permissible scope of campus speech codes.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR RESTRICTING TARGETED,
ABUSIVE SPEECH
A. Defining the Relevant Factors
First, and most obviously, speech can be restricted if it is part of a
course of prohibited conduct. This factor justifies punishing expressive
interactions that constitute a criminal conspiracy. It recognizes a conduct
dimension to threats of physical violence. Further, it explains why
employers can be prohibited from creating or tolerating hostile working
environments for racial minorities or women under federal anti-
discrimination statutes. Since the government can prohibit the practice of
race or sex discrimination in employment, it can also restrict expression
that constitutes the implementation of discriminatory policies.26
A corollary ground for restricting expression recognizes that some
speech is intended to provoke violence or other unlawful conduct and is
so likely to produce that immediate result that it may be prohibited.27 This
limitation on speech represents the conclusion of the long, evolutionary
development of the "clear and present danger" standard.28 Under current
standards, the doctrine is rigorously limited to apply only to speech that
creates a significant risk of inciting violence within a relatively brief time
frame.29
Second, expression may be subject to regulation because of the
intensity of its impact on those who hear it or see it, and because the
expression is of very limited communicative value. This factor is far more
See Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty,
59 U. CHI. L. REv. 225, 241-42 (1992).
26 See Alan E. Brownstein, Regulating Hate Speech at Public Universities: Are First
Amendment Values Functionally Incompatible with Equal Protection Principles?, 39 BUFF.
L. REV. 1, 48-51 (1991). Important questions remain to be resolved, however, in
identifying the circumstances in which employer or employee expression constitutes
actionable discrimination and loses its protected status as speech.
2 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 832-56 (1988).
29 See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973).
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controversial than the first. Therefore, it bears emphasizing at the outset
that, standing alone, the hurtful impact and limited communicative value
of expression is rarely an adequate basis for restricting speech.
The factor does apply, however, in a narrow range of circumstances
when it is combined with other factors. Even as stalwart a defender of
First Amendment freedoms as Justice Brennan recognized this potential
basis for restricting speech. While Brennan ultimately argued, for example,
that obscene expression should be protected against suppression, he
recognized that the state might legitimately protect unconsenting adults
from "obtrusive exposure" to sexually explicit materials. 30 A person's
emotional reaction to erotic expression may be intense and personal.
Displays of such power that they cannot be ignored by an unconsenting
member of the audience jeopardize the ability of individuals to conceal
deeply felt emotional responses from public scrutiny.3'
The complementary principle to this concern is that the expression
producing an intense emotional reaction must be of little communicative
value to be subject to restriction. Shouting at a staff member leaving an
abortion clinic that he or she "tears babies apart and murders them" may
produce an intense, almost involuntary response on the part of the listener.
The possibility of such a reaction is less likely to justify restricting this
kind of speech, however, because of the political message communicated
by the anti-abortion speaker. Prohibiting the vivid display of hard core, but
technically not obscene, pornography in a public park among unconsenting
adults enjoying a picnic on a Sunday afternoon is more defensible, in part,
because of the limited message, if any, intrinsic to this expression.32
30 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
31 Id. at 106-07. The problem with such intrusive exposure to pornography is not that
it may offend the unconsenting adults who confront it, but that it provokes personal
reactions that the viewer does not wish to experience or display, particularly in a public
environment. In that sense, the public distribution of pornography to an unconsenting
audience constitutes an invasion of privacy. Id.; see infra notes 41-42 and accompanying
text; see also TRIBE, supra note 28, at 953-55.
32 Similarly, offensive as it is, a person deliberately burning an American flag in front
of a war veteran and screaming, "[t]his is what I think of the country that fools like you
fought for," is communicating a political message even if an additional purpose of the
speaker is to disturb and insult his victim. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989) (holding that a person who bums the American flag for expressive reasons may
not be punished because "a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment ... is that
the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds
the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."). It is far less clear that ideas are being
communicated by displaying pornography to people having a picnic for the purpose of
disturbing their event.
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Third, expressive activity may be restricted if it invades the privacy of
the person to whom it is directed. The weight assigned to the protection
of privacy interests as a justification for restricting speech depends to a
significant extent on the location of the listener. The right to be free of
unwanted communications in one's own home is respected far more than
a person's interest in not seeing or listening to expression on a public
street.33
First Amendment case law recognizes both the primacy of privacy
interests as well as the locational limitations that reduce this factor's
ability to sustain the regulation of speech. Thus, for example, in Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department,34 the Supreme Court upheld a
federal statute that permitted a homeowner receiving unwanted, sexually
explicit advertisements to obtain a post office order requiring the sender
to desist from sending additional materials to the protesting addressee.35
Emphasizing that "a man's home is his castle," the Court noted that
even First Amendment guarantees did not give vendors the right "to send
unwanted material into the home of another. ' 36 Similarly, the Court
pointed to "the unique nature of the home" in Frisby v. Schultz,37 a case
upholding a municipality's ban on residential picketing in front of an
individual's house. "The State's interest in protecting the well-being,
tranquillity, and privacy of the home" was held to be a value "of the
highest order in a free and civilized society," and sufficient to justify a
content-neutral restriction on expressive activity. 38
The narrow boundaries within which an individual's privacy interests
will be found to support restrictions on speech were stated in particularly
strong terms in Cohen v. California.39 The Court reversed the conviction
The distinction between low value and high value speech and the distinction between
low impact and high impact expression will inevitably involve content discriminatory
judgments by decision makers. While one can sensibly discuss and debate important
questions about who should make such judgments and what rules should limit the decision
maker's discretion, it is pointless to pretend that people can be protected against abusive
speech without examining and evaluating the content of what is being said. The telephone
harassment cases, see infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text, demonstrate this
conclusively. See also David F. McGowan & Ragesh K. Tangri, A Libertarian Critique
of University Restrictions of Offensive Speech, 79 CAL. L. REV. 825, 853-60 (1991).
33 See Brownstein, supra note 26, at 48.
14 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
" Id. at 735-38.
36 Id. at 737-38.
17 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
18 Id. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)).
" 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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of a young man arrested for wearing a jacket in the corridor of a
courthouse with a phrase containing a vulgar, four-letter word on its
back. n° In defending its decision, the Court explained:
The mere presumed presence of unwilling listeners or
viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all
speech capable of giving offense. While this Court has
recognized that government may properly act in many
situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home
of unwelcome views and ideas which cannot be totally
banned from the public dialogue, we have at the same time
consistently stressed that "we are often 'captives' outside
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable
speech." [citing Rowan] The ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely
to protect others from hearing it is, in other words,
dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests
are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.4 '
While the commitment of the Court to affirming personal privacy as
an accepted limit on speech is clear, the rationale for recognizing this
interest seems anomalous, particularly when the two most commonly
accepted grounds for restricting abusive speech, protecting privacy and
prohibiting fighting words, are considered together. In a sense these
categories of expression represent almost contradictory interests. If the goal
of prohibiting the use of "fighting words" is to avoid an ensuing brawl
and the injuries andl disorder that will follow, the state is primarily
interested in restricting the public use of such language. It is in the public
arena that "fighting words" can cause the most harm.
The objective of protecting the home against verbal invasions, on the
other hand, is focused exclusively on private speech that causes personal
harm. Speech intruding into the home can almost never constitute fighting
words. The public seldom hears the offensive language, the surrounding
environment is unconducive to social disorder, and, indeed, the speaker is
rarely in sufficiently close proximity to the listener to make a violent
* reaction logistically possible. Viewed from this perspective, these two
grounds for restricting speech have nothing to do with each other.
It may be, however, that there is more of a connection between
protecting privacy interests and prohibiting fighting words than is generally
40 Id. at 16-17 (the defendant's jacket bore the words "Fuck the Draft").
41 Id. at 21.
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recognized. Perhaps the unprotected status of fighting words does not rest
exclusively on the breach of the peace such language may provoke. The
harm resulting from the use of fighting words may include not only the
risk of physical damage to persons or property, but the emotional effect of
these words on their intended victim as well.
This alternative injury to be avoided involves an emotional reaction so
severe that it may be immediately expressed through violence. The victim
of fighting words is not simply offended, rather he is confronted with
expression that will often, predictably, result in the loss of his self-control.
It is that shattering of a person's ability to maintain his public self and to
restrain his private emotional responses that constitutes a distinct,
unacceptable consequence of fighting words. If fighting words can be
prohibited because of this result, then there is a sense in which this
category of unprotected speech rests on an interest in preserving personal
privacy and autonomy, as well as the need to maintain public order. The
unprotected status of fighting words under this analysis is doctrinally
linked to the protection provided to the individual against unwanted speech
in her home. Both limits on expression are component aspects of a broadly
defined interest in protecting the privacy and autonomy of the individual
against intolerable intrusion.
Fourth, government may regulate expression to protect the autonomy
interest of the person who does not want to listen to what a speaker has
to say.42 This factor is often overlooked by commentators who cite the
cases described above and emphasize the limited range of locations in
which privacy interests are strong enough to counter freedom of speech.43
Yet the residential privacy cases make it clear that a fundamental
component of the Court's concern for protecting personal privacy in the
home is respect for the individual's decision to decline to be the recipient
of directed communications. Indeed, it may be fair to argue that the
individual's interest in residential privacy that the Court recognizes in
these cases is merely a subset of the broader, more varied interest in
personal autonomy.
In Rowan, for example, the Court acknowledged that allowing
householders to demand that no further advertising by mail be delivered
to their address might "impede the flow of even valid ideas."" That
result, however, was acceptable since "no one has a right to press even
42 See, e.g., Franklyn S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken
To?, 67 Nw. U. L. REV. 153 (1972).
4" See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on 'Racist
Speech"' The View From Without and Within, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 631, 666-71 (1992).
'4 Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
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'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient."45 This principle was expressed
even more directly in the Frisby decision. The Court stated explicitly that
"[o]ne important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the
unwilling listener."46 Similarly, in one older case, Martin v. Struthers,47
the Court struck down a ban on door-to-door soliciting in a community as
a violation of the First Amendment, despite the city's argument that it was
legitimately attempting to protect the privacy and tranquility of its
residents.48 While a total ban on all solicitation violated the First
Amendment, what the city could do consistent with constitutional
requirements was to "punish those who call at a home in defiance of the
previously expressed will of the occupant. ' 49 Thus, while residential
privacy concerns alone could not justify the suppression of expression,
privacy interests combined with the autonomy interest in declining to
receive expression outweighed the solicitor's freedom of speech.5"
B. The Relationship Between Privacy, Autonomy, and Speech
In order to determine the extent to which an individual may be
protected against abusive speech in a public setting, it is necessary to
carefully analyze the Court's apparent willingness to permit restrictions on
unwanted speech that intrude into a person's home. How much of the
Court's concerns about protecting the home against unwanted expression
are based on the special status of residential privacy and how much are
based on other factors that are applicable to more public locations as well?
To facilitate the discussion of this question, let us designate the primary
participants in an expressive interaction. We will identify A as the speaker,
B as an individual who does not want to hear what A has to say, and C as
an individual who does want to hear A's expression, or at least wants the
opportunity to decide for himself whether A is worth listening to.
It is important to recognize in this kind of a hypothetical that all three
participants may assert an autonomy interest that is worthy of respect. A's
speech may be of little instrumental value in helping society to resolve
important public policy issues, but it is still important as an expression of
who A is and how he wants to be understood. B, of course, wants to be
left alone, to choose to refuse to participate in the expressive encounter.
45 Id.
46 Frisby v Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
47 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
48 Id. at 144.
41 Id. at 148.
50 In doctrinal terms, the holding of Martin is also understood as requiring the state to
use the least restrictive alternative in limiting speech to further legitimate state interests.
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C insists on being treated as a morally responsible actor capable of
deciding whether or not to listen to A without coercive interference. C
wants the opportunity to hear what A has to say even if C ultimately
decides that A is not worth listening to.5
In determining the scope of A's freedom of speech, all three of these
competing autonomy interests have to be recognized and reconciled with
each other. Obviously, however, it is impossible to provide all three
interests complete protection. Under established First Amendment
principles, courts have decided that attempts to protect B's autonomy
interest in personal privacy must accommodate C's autonomy interest in
hearing what A has to say. Thus, if A is communicating to the general
public, a group that includes C, and B, a potential part of A's audience,
will be terribly offended by what A has to say, the state cannot silence A
to protect B. Given the choice between silencing A and depriving C of the
opportunity to hear A, and asking B to take reasonable steps to withdraw
from A's audience, the First Amendment generally prohibits the first
option. B is left on his own to avail himself of whatever alternatives are
open to him to avoid A's offensive speech. With regard to public
expression, the autonomy interests of the unwilling listener, B, are
outweighed by the autonomy interests of the potentially willing listener, C,
and the free speech rights of A.
The substantial weight assigned to C's interest in receiving speech in
resolving a conflict between A and B can be illustrated by the Rowan case
discussed previously. Home resident B does not want to receive A's
sexually explicit advertisements which are mailed to a large list of
potential customers. To enable B to avoid confronting this material for
even a brief period of time in his home, the state could ban the distribution
of A's expression. Such a regulation would violate the First Amendment,
however, since it would deprive the C's of the world of the opportunity
to evaluate A's expression. B's privacy interests in his home cannot justify
a law that would prohibit A from communicating to a potentially receptive
audience.
While home resident B cannot escape from receiving that first
unwanted communication from A, B can have his autonomy and privacy
interests protected to some significant extent by forcing A to drop B from
his mailing list. In this context, A can be prohibited ftom communicating
with B, a person who has explicitly rejected receiving any further
expression from A, without seriously interfering with A's ability to
communicate with C or other third parties. Since a mechanism exists, by
deleting B's name from A's mailing list, and essentially factoring C's
" See Fried, supra note 25, at 233-41.
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interests out of the equation, the Court in Rowan is asked to balance A's
interests against B's interests directly. The result is that B's interests are
protected.
What is less clear is why B's interests are protected in Rowan. How
critical to the Court's conclusion is the fact that the expression at issue
was directed to B's home? Alternatively, how much of the decision can
be grounded on B's interest in refusing to receive further communications
from A in a situation in which there is no C, no potentially willing
recipient of A's speech whose autonomy rights would conflict with B?
That question cannot be answered easily in many situations because of
the difficulty of disentangling the competing interests at stake. Thus, for
example, an attempt to apply a Rowan-type regulation to the distribution
of potentially offensive leaflets on a street corner, by allowing a pedestrian
to tell the distributor not to attempt to give her a leaflet again, would
almost certainly violate the First Amendment. That result can be explained
by pointing to locational differences between the two situations. Rowan
involves mail to a person's home, a private location, while the leafleting
occurs on a public sidewalk.
The same result also follows, however, from the recognition that
protecting B's autonomy interests cannot justify prohibiting A from
communicating to C, a potentially willing listener whose autonomy interest
in being allowed to read A's expression also deserves respect. In the
leafleting situation, unlike direct mail activities in which names can be
deleted from mailing lists, it would place an intolerable burden on the
distributor to require him to be able to remember and identify each
pedestrian who indicated that they did not want to receive leaflets in the
future. Thus, in the leafleting example, the conflict between B and C's
autonomy interests is unavoidable and continuing, while these competing
interests are effectively reconciled when B is permitted to demand that A
discontinue mailings to B's home.
The problem that is the focus of this Article requires an answer to this
question. When A, a bigot, uses racial epithets to insult B, a black student
walking to class, A is not attempting to communicate with the general
public, or even to a group. A only wants to talk to B. There is no C, no
potentially willing listener to complicate the expressive interaction. If B
does not want to talk to A in this situation, the conflict between A's right
to speak and B's autonomy interest in not listening to A is presented in its
starkest form. Further, if B is not in his home, there is no locational
privacy dimension to be added to B's autonomy interests in attempting to
justify the abridgement of A's speech rights.
While recent Supreme Court decisions appear to accept the idea that
evaluating restrictions on expression targeted at an individual involves a
qualitatively different mix of speech and autonomy interests than reviewing
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public speech regulations, they do not provide a functional framework for
the balancing of those interests. In the Frisby case, in upholding a city's
ban on residential picketing directed at a specific homeowner, the Court
clearly recognized the special nature of this kind of communication, of
"speech directed primarily at those who are presumptively unwilling to
receive it."'52 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, explicitly noted
that the type of picketing prohibited, anti-abortion protests at the home of
a doctor who performed abortions, did "not seek to disseminate a message
to the general public," but instead sought "to intrude upon the targeted
resident, and to do so in an especially offensive way."'5 3 Still, focusing as
it does on a residential picketing ban, the Frisby decision only illustrates
again the common overlap of privacy and autonomy interests. It does not
suggest how much value would be assigned to the latter interest alone if
it is asserted as the basis for restricting speech.
Despite this ambiguity, it seems certain that each of these two factors,
privacy and autonomy, must be evaluated by the courts when they are
engaged in the evaluation of speech regulations. While the Court's
language in some cases, such as Cohen v. California,54 suggests that only
the strongest kind of privacy interests could support the prohibition of
offensive speech, it must be remembered that the message on Mr. Cohen's
jacket was expressed to the general public. Some people may have been
offended by Mr. Cohen's message, but other people may have approved
of both its content and its language. The Cohen case did not involve
abusive speech targeted at a particular individual.55 Speech of that kind
may also ultimately be protected against prohibition except when
substantial privacy interests are at stake, but for a court to reach that
conclusion it must carefully consider the autonomy interests of the victim
of such expression, as well as the other factors discussed in this Article,
in a way that the Court in Cohen did not. It simply cannot be assumed that
Mr. Cohen's conviction would have been reversed if he had directed
specific, abusive insults at racial minorities and women using the public
courthouse.
III. HATE SPEECH AND HARASSMENT
The necessity for applying the aforementioned factors in any evaluation
of the constitutionality of a campus regulation prohibiting the use of racial
epithets, as well as the utility in doing so, can be demonstrated by
5' Frisby v Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1980).
" Id. at 486.
14 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
5 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
192 [Vol. 3:1
HATE SPEECH AND HARASSMENT
examining judicial decisions reviewing anti-harassment laws. Focusing on
anti-harassment regulations serves several important objectives. The
prohibition of harassment, particularly telephone harassment, is one of the
most conventional and universally respected restrictions on speech. There
have been dozens of court cases involving constitutional challenges to
telephone harassment statutes, and the overwhelming majority of those
decisions have upheld the challenged laws.56
In addition, in most cases of telephone harassment, the law cannot be
defended on the grounds that it is narrowly addressed to the suppression
of fighting words. Because of the logistics of the activity, there is virtually
no possibility that a harassing phone call will result in an immediate,
violent confrontation.57 Thus, some other justification for restricting speech
must be available to explain judicial support for this type of regulation.
Furthermore, the language used in harassment statutes involves terminol-
ogy that seems to be as vulnerable to claims of vagueness and overbreadth
as the language employed in campus hate speech codes. Telephone
harassment statutes typically prohibit speech intended to annoy, torment,
embarrass, disturb, and, of course, harass the recipient of the call.
58
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even prominent proponents of
freedom of speech recognize the legitimacy of campus codes that prohibit
harassment based on race or sex. The Northern and Southern California
affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union, for example, have adopted
56 See, e.g., State v. Gattis, 730 P.2d 497, 501 n.1 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
decisions in 21 states and 2 Federal circuits upholding telephone harassment statutes
against constitutional challenge); see also infra notes 59-75 and accompanying text. But
see Kramer v. Price 712 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983) (striking down Texas telephone
harassment statute as unconstitutionally vague); Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975) (striking down Virginia telephone harassment
statute as overbroad); People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329 (I11. 1977) (stating that an Illinois
telephone harassment statute is unconstitutionally overbroad).
After the Second Circuit upheld Connecticut's telephone harassment statute in Gormley
v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1980), the petitioner
sought Supreme Court review, but her petition for certiorari was denied. New York v.
Howard, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980). Justice White dissented from that decision, arguing that
telephone harassment statutes raised significant overbreadth concerns. Id. at 1023-25.
" See, e.g., Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5 n.7 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
906 (1975); Yates v. Commonwealth, 753 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988); Seattle
v. Huff, 767 P.2d 572, 574 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
58 See, e.g., People v. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780, 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)
(upholding state statute which provided: "(1) Any person is guilty of a misdemeanor who
maliciously uses any service provided by a communications common carrier with intent
to terrorize, frighten, intimidate, threaten, harass, molest or annoy any other person, or to
disturb the peace and quiet of any other person by any of the following: ... (d) using any
vulgar, indecent, obscene or offensive language or suggesting any lewd or lascivious act
in the course of a telephone conversation.").
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a policy on campus hate speech codes which provides in part that, "[t]he
intentional harassment of a person by another person or persons is not
constitutionally protected." The ACLU goes on to explain that,
"[a]lthough 'harassment' is an imprecise term, it defines a type of
conduct which is legally proscribed in many jurisdictions when it is
directed at a specific individual or individuals and when it is intended in
some measure to frighten, coerce, or unreasonably harry or intrude upon
its target."59
Not only is this definition of harassment unclear; its lack of clarity
suggests uncertainty as to the constitutional principle on which it is
grounded. Exactly which first amendment theory recognizes the
unprotected status of frightening, coercive, unreasonably harrying or
intrusive speech? If there is a principled basis for prohibiting verbal
harassment of the kind that the ACLU describes, the explanation of that
principle must extend beyond a list of problematic effects. Similarly, there
is no simple rule on which to ground the judicial receptivity to upholding
telephone harassment statutes. Instead, it is necessary to carefully examine
the decisions upholding these laws against constitutional challenge to
understand the doctrinal foundation on which they are based.
A. The Judicial Defense of Telephone Harassment Statutes
Not surprisingly, many judicial decisions attempt to circumvent or
avoid the difficult constitutional problems raised by anti-harassment laws.
Thus, some courts contend that telephone harassment statutes do not
regulate speech at all; instead, harassment laws are interpreted as being
directed at the conduct of making a phone call with the intent to disturb
the recipient of the call.6° While that argument might have some merit in
the situation in which the caller does not communicate with his victim, but
simply uses the ringing of the phone to annoy another person, it makes
little sense in the majority of cases where the content and language of the
conversation between the speaker and listener is the primary basis for the
59 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF SOUTHERN CAL. AND NORTHERN CAL., POLICY
CONCERNING RACIST AND OTHER GROUP-BASED HARASSMENT ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
2 (1991).
6 See, e.g., Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 984 (1988); Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938,
941-42 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1023 (1980); Baker v. State, 494 P.2d 68,
70 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687, 690 (Fla. 1980); People v.
Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780, 783 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Camp, 295 S.E.2d 766,
768 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
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court concluding that harassment has occurred.6' In reality, in most cases
"oral communication" is the "conduct" being punished, and expression,
ugly and harmful as it may be, "is an essential element of the crime.
' 62
Put simply, to argue that telephone harassment statutes restrict conduct,
not speech, is to distort the meaning of harassment and the nature of the
offense. The content of an allegedly harassing phone call is not incidental
to the determination that the call constitutes harassment. The content of the
phone call is often what makes the activity harassment. It is the language
used, the message conveyed, and the anticipated impact of the speech that
distinguishes between a benign and a harassing phone call.63 One can
6 Thus, in Thorne, for example, the court indicated that the defendant began the
telephone calls on which his conviction was based by asking legitimate questions of
university officials. As the conversations progressed, however, the defendant's "language
and tone became harassing" as he referred to university officials as "racist pigs" and
"bigot[s]." Thorne, 846 F.2d at 243. The use of this "harassing language" was held
to justify the defendant's conviction. Id. at 243-44. Similarly, in Gormley, the defendant
was convicted of a criminal offense for making a single phone call to the restaurant at
which the complainant worked. In the course of that phone call, the defendant described
the complainant as a "tramp," stated that the complainant's mother was a whore who
had gone to bed with the defendant's husband, and added that the "complainant's family
were a bunch of nuts and were all under psychiatric care." Gormley, 632 F.2d at 940.
The court concluded that an evaluation of the content of the defendant's remarks was
"indispensable to a proper determination" of whether sufficient intent to harass had been
proven. Id. at 943.
62 See, e.g., Thorne, 846 F.2d at 245 (Butzner, J., dissenting) ("Conversation is an
essential element of the crime the statute punishes."); Gormley, 632 F.2d at 944
(Mansfield, J., concurring) ("Labelling [a telephone harassment] statute as one prohibiting
'conduct' does not resolve this constructional dilemma [since] in most cases the
'conduct' punished is ... oral communication .... "); State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817,
824 (W. Va. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996 (1985) (Miller, J., dissenting) (stating that
telephone harassment cases in which a court upholds a statute on the grounds it regulates
conduct, not speech, "have a sophistry that I find repugnant where, as here, legitimate
communication ensues").
63 See supra note 58. Even a carefully worded harassment statute that defines the
offense as intentionally harassing another person "by causing the telephone of the other
person to ring, such caller having no communicative purpose," see, e.g., State v.
Hibbard, 823 P.2d 989, 990 (Or. Ct. App. 1991), must be evaluated as a restriction on
speech, not conduct, if the conversation between defendant and complainant is "the only
evidence" of harassing intent. A critical element of the offense in such a case is the
determination that the defendant's expression lacked communicative purpose, a
conclusion that must be recognized as raising freedom of speech concerns. Otherwise,
virtually any speech restriction could avoid first amendment review through careful
drafting. A law prohibiting one person from "approaching another person with the intent
to harass that person" could be upheld as a constitutional regulation of conduct despite
the fact that it was routinely applied to expressive activity, as is true with telephone
harassment statutes.
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reasonably argue that there is a conduct dimension to this expressive
activity, but that does not alter the fact that it can be the speech being
communicated, not the ringing of the telephone, that justifies criminal
sanction.
Other courts acknowledge that telephone harassment statutes abridge
speech, but argue that these laws are constitutional because the substantial
privacy interest of the listener in her home outweighs the speaker's first
amendment right to communicate with the listener in that location.'
Protecting the privacy of the listener is certainly one factor that helps to
justify upholding harassment statutes, but that objective by itself cannot
successfully explain the relevant case law. Residential privacy alone has
never been accepted as a sufficient basis for shielding the individual at
home from all annoying or disturbing communications. Thus, Colorado's
harassment statute, which restricted both telephone calls and mail, could
not constitutionally be applied to punish an anti-abortion activist who sent
graphic pictures of aborted fetuses along with anti-abortion literature to
hundreds of homes.65
Moreover, most harassment statutes are not limited to calls to a
person's home. People have been enjoined from or convicted for making
harassing calls to places of employment, various business enterprises,
government offices, public universities, and police stations.66 Obviously,
64 See, e.g., People v. Weeks, 591 P.2d 91, 95-97 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) ("The First
Amendment does not extend to any person the right to use his power of speech as a
battering ram to destroy the tranquility and repose of another person's home."); State v.
Elder, 382 So. 2d 687, 691-93 (Fla. 1980); State v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d 822, 826-27
(Mo. 1981) (en banc); State v. Kipf, 450 N.W.2d 397, 406-09 (Neb. 1990).
65 See Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83-84 (Colo. 1975) (en banc) (stating that the
goal of protecting the right of privacy in the home does not justify prosecution of
distributor of graphic anti-abortion materials). See generally Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141, 150 (1943) (Murphy, J. concurring) (noting that the tension between constitutional
rights of expression and religious liberty and the state's interest in protecting residential
privacy should be resolved by "accommodation" rather than "repression"); People v.
Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ill. 1977) (stating that a right of privacy in the home only
justifies prohibition of intolerably intrusive expressive activity).
66 See, e.g., Gormley, 632 F.2d at 940 (regarding calls to restaurant where complainant
was employed); State v. Hagen, 558 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (regarding calls to
chief of police); Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641 (Mass. 1983)
(upholding injunction against harassing calls to government offices upheld); People v.
Taravella, 350 N.W.2d 780 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (regarding a call to salesperson at
furniture store); State v. Finance Am. Corp., 440 A.2d 28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981) (regarding a call to cashier supervisor at work); People v. Smith, 392 N.Y.S.2d 968
(N.Y. App. Term. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 393 (1977) (regarding calls to police
department); State v. Camp, 295 S.E.2d 766 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (regarding calls to
sheriff's department); State v. Hibbard, 823 P.2d 989 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (regarding calls
to 9-1-1 emergency service); Collection Consultants, Inc. v. State, 556 S.W.2d 787 (Tex.
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privacy interests at these public locations must stand on a different and
lower order of value than an individual's home, yet the convictions of
callers to such locations have been sustained.
It is also argued that by limiting the coverage of harassment statutes
to calls that are intended to annoy, torment, threaten, or harass the listener,
the law can avoid violating the First Amendment.67 An intent requirement,
however, is hardly a constitutional cure-all for restrictions on speech. It
does remedy some of the vagueness and overbreadth concerns that would
otherwise be directed at these statutes. An intent requirement precludes the
application of a harassment law to innocent remarks that unexpectedly
offend the listener.68 At best, that result only establishes that an intent
requirement may be a necessary condition of a constitutional anti-
harassment statute; it does not make an intent to annoy or disturb
requirement sufficient grounds for upholding the regulation of speech.69
Indeed, the case law includes an almost limitless list of hypothetical
examples of intentionally annoying telephone calls that are clearly
protected against restriction by the First Amendment. These examples
include calls by angry parents to a college student with failing grades,
angry and dissatisfied consumers complaining to the provider of a
defective good or service, a businessperson challenging the apparent
Crim. App. 1977) (regarding calls to complainant at his office); Perkins v.
Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 229 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (regarding calls to pharmacy); State
v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1985) (regarding calls to officials at public university).
See generally State v. Koetting, 691 S.W.2d 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (applying telephone
harassment statute applies to calls directed to specific individual at home or business).
67 See, e.g., United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 787 (3d Cir. 1978) ("Congress
had a compelling interest in the protection of innocent individuals from fear, abuse or
annoyance at the hands of persons who employ the telephone, not to communicate, but
for other unjustifiable motives."); State v. Elder, 382 So. 2d 687, 691 (Fla. 1980); State
v. Thompson, 701 P.2d 694, 697-98 (Kan. 1985).
68 See, e.g., Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3, 5 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating that the provisions
of harassment statute are so broad without intent requirement that they might apply to
"[a]n intemperate expression of understandable and wholesome indignation"); Radford
v. Webb, 446 F. Supp. 608, 610-11 (W.D. N.C. 1978); People v. Taravella, 350 N.W.2d
780, 784 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Koetting, 691 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); State v. Koetting, 616 S.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Mo. 1981).
69 While an intent requirement reduces the vagueness of a telephone harassment statute,
it does not eliminate the problem since "the conduct which must be motivated by intent,
as well as the standard by which that conduct is to be assessed, remain vague." Kramer
v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 1983). Requiring an intent to annoy or harass does
not adequately explain what a person with such an intent may not do. State v. Blair, 601
P.2d 766, 768 (Or. 1979).
Vagueness aside, it is difficult to argue that the state may prohibit all telephone calls
intended to annoy, disturb, or harass the recipient of the call without violating the First
Amendment. See infra note 70.
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dishonesty of a competitor or protesting the failure of a supplier to meet
a contractual obligation, a colleague demanding the repayment of a debt,
disgruntled or irate citizens challenging the conduct of public officials,
political activists attempting to arouse a complacent constituency,
neighbors demanding that a barking dog be silenced, and tenants insisting
that adequate repairs be provided to their apartment by the lethargic
landlord.7° Many of these examples are posed by dissenting or concurring
judges who are almost never successfully responded to by a judicial
majority committed to upholding the challenged statute. 7' Nor is it likely
that any proffered answer would be satisfactory since the First Amendment
so clearly protects expression intended to criticize or provoke people in
order to influence their behavior.72
It is easier to recognize the problem presented by this issue than it is
to resolve it. Some states attempt to do so by explicitly excluding from the
coverage of their telephone harassment statutes any phone call that is in-
tended to serve a legitimate purpose on the theory that a law directed
exclusively at expression of very limited communicative value has a
stronger claim to constitutional acceptance. 73 The objective of this kind of
70 See, e.g., Gormley, 632 F.2d at 944 (Mansfield, J., concurring); State v. Elder, 382
So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 1980); People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 331-32 (I11. 1977); Blair,
601 P.2d at 768 (Or. 1979); Kramer v. State, 605 S.W.2d 861, 874 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980)
(Roberts, J., dissenting); State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817, 824-25 (W. Va. 1985) (Miller,
C.J., dissenting); State v. Dronso, 279 N.W.2d 710, 714 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
71 See supra note 70.
72 See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (stating that speech
is protected even though it is "provocative and challenging," has "profound unsettling
effects," or "stirs people to anger"); Bolles v. People, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (Colo. 1975)
(explaining that the "absurdity" of contending that all speech intended to annoy or alarm
the listener can be prohibited "is patently obvious to anyone who envisions our society
in anything but a state of languid repose"); State v. Kipf, 450 N.W.2d 397, 407 (Neb.
1990) (citing Bolles for the principle that "a function of free speech under our system
of government is to invite dispute, including unsettling, disturbing, arousing, or annoying
communications.").
71 See, e.g., United States v. Darsey, 342 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(stating that to avoid restricting normal, but heated, communication, Congress drafted
federal telephone harassment statute to punish only calls made "solely to harass"
recipients); Elder, 382 So. 2d at 691 (construing harassment statute not to apply to calls
that "serve a legitimate communicative or informative function"); Yates v. Common-
wealth, 753 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that harassment statute only
applies to calls that serve "no purpose of legitimate communication"); State v. Gattis,
730 P.2d 497, 501 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the requirement that harassing
calls must be made "maliciously" excludes valid, but annoying calls made with
"just cause or excuse"); Bachowski v. Salamone, 407 N.W.2d 533, 538-39, 542
n.4 (Wis. 1987) (limiting harassment statute to acts "which serve no legitimate
purpose").
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a provision is understandable; indeed, some such limitation may be a
constitutional necessity. If a harassment statute is to withstand first amend-
ment challenge, some distinction must be drawn between low value, high
impact, harmful speech, and legitimate critical expression. The difficulty
arises in trying to define this constraint with sufficient precision to avoid
concerns about vagueness and overbreadth that are inherent in a "no
legitimate purpose" standard.74 One way that states have tried to do that
is to describe with some particularity certain kinds of speech, sexually
explicit, vulgar, or indecent, that are considered to have limited value for
communicative purposes when they are directed at a non-consenting
listener.75
An alternative approach is to focus on the extent to which the allegedly
harassing calls are repeated.76 Intuitively, frequently repeated phone calls
represent especially convincing evidence that the defendant's expressive
activity constitutes telephone harassment. If one person phones an alleged
victim twenty or thirty times a week, a judge or jury will have little
difficulty determining that such behavior is harassment and unprotected by
the First Amendment unless there are extraordinary extenuating
circumstances to justify the caller's activity. 77
74 See, e.g., Bolles, 541 P.2d at 83 (holding that the phrase "without any legitimate
purpose" is too vague to withstand first amendment review since it provides "no
ascertainable standards" as to how that determination is to be made).
71 See, e.g., Darsey, 342 F. Supp. at 313 (applying federal statute punishing telephone
calls that include "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent" comments); State v.
Hagen, 558 P.2d 750, 753 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that "[b]y specifying the intent
with which the call must be made and the nature of the language prohibited [obscene,
lewd or profane expression], the statute clearly demonstrates that the prohibited activities
find no protection under the First Amendment."); State v. Jaeger, 249 N.W.2d 688, 689
(Iowa 1977) (prohibiting "obscene, lewd or profane" language); People v. Taravella, 350
N.W.2d 780, 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (prohibiting "vulgar, indecent, obscene or
offensive language"); Kipf, 450 N.W.2d at 409 (Neb. 1990) (holding that the state has
a compelling interest in protecting people from "sexual speech which intrudes upon the
privacy of innocent citizens, not for the purpose of communicating any thought, but for
the purpose of causing mental discomfort by conjuring up repugnant sexual images").
76 See, e.g., Darsey, 342 F. Supp. at 313 (stating that violating federal statute requires
that phone calls must be solely to harass recipient and must be repeated); Constantino v.
State, 255 S.E.2d 710, 712 (Ga. 1979) (prosecuting defendants for telephoning
complainants repeatedly to harass them); State v. Meunier, 354 So. 2d 535, 539 (La.
1978) (charging defendants with making repeated phone calls in a manner reasonably
expected to harass the recipient).
77 See, e.g., United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783, 786 (3d Cir. 1978) (reporting that
defendant "unleased a barrage of incessant and subsequently abusive phone calls," on
the average of 10 to 12 per week); People v. Hernandez, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1376, 1380
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (80 phone calls within a two week period); State v. Camp, 295
S.E.2d 766, 767-69 (N.C. App. 1982) (stating that the "content and number" of the 500
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This commonsense intuition requires some explanation, however.
Nothing in the First Amendment suggests, after all, that a person's
freedom of speech is intrinsically limited to saying something only once.
Why should a statement lose the constitutional protection it receives when
it is first stated simply because it is repeated to the same audience?
B. Repetition as a Component of Harassment
Repetition seems to justify the conclusion that expression is harassment
and unprotected for three reasons. To begin with, the more a statement is
repeated, the more doubtful we become that the speaker's purpose involves
the communication of information or opinion. Even highly emotional
criticism loses its persuasive force over time, although it may retain its
ability to disturb and annoy. Thus, excessive repetition suggests that the
person placing the phone calls does not intend his expressive activity to
serve any communicative function that deserves respect or protection.
Rather, the repeated calls are intended to be nothing more than bare, verbal
abuse.
Similarly, while repeated phone calls are still technically communica-
tive in nature, they are of little value in objective terms, regardless of their
intent. Whatever message the caller hoped to communicate has already
been received. While repetition can demonstrate the intensity of the
caller's conviction or emotion, and his commitment to influencing the
person receiving the call, the marginal reinforcement of that intensity will
eventually be all but totally diluted as the number of calls increases.
Ultimately, the very limited communicative value remaining in the content
of the call is easily outweighed by the harm being inflicted on the
listener.7 8
Finally, repeated phone calls almost always involve a listener who has
indicated in unmistakable terms that they do not want to continue to be
spoken to by the person placing the call.79 A person's interest in avoiding
phone calls placed by defendant demonstrate that his activities were not protected by First
Amendment).
78 Justice Stevens seemed to adopt this analysis in discussing the constitutionality of
a ban on residential picketing applied to anti-abortion protestors at the home of a doctor
who performed abortions. Stevens noted that "picketers have a right to communicate their
strong opposition to abortion to the doctor, but after they have had a fair opportunity to
communicate that message, I see little justification for allowing them to remain in front
of his home and repeat it over and over again simply to harm the doctor and his family."
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 498 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 See, e.g., State v. Koetting, 691 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Mo. 1985) (involving defendant
who called complainant 11 or 12 times despite repeated requests that the calls be
stopped); Kipf, 450 N.W.2d at 397, 402 (Neb. 1990) (involving defendant who
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communication from another, like a person's interest in residential privacy,
is not absolute. Critical and disparaging comments may be painful to hear,
but such expression has recognized value even if it is repeated.80 An
individual's autonomy interest in not hearing criticism of her behavior will
not typically justify state regulations preventing a speaker from calling
someone back to continue telling them why her conduct should change. 8'
. Still, the autonomy interest in not being spoken to, or in not receiving
an unwanted telephone call, is another factor to consider in determining
whether speech interests are outweighed by legitimate regulatory concerns.
As the communicative value of the speaker's expression declines through
repetition, the disturbance and harm resulting from repeated calls increase.
Eventually, the conjunction of the listener's autonomy interests, the limited
value of the speaker's expression, and the harm caused to the listener
justify the suppression of speech and the punishment of additional calls as
harassment.
The above discussion concerning the importance of repetition in
determining that speech constitutes harassment is based on the assumption
that the expression at issue had some claim to legitimacy in its initial
utterance. Obviously, however, not all harassment prosecutions involve
such ostensibly legitimate or valuable expression and they do not all
require a significant number of repeated calls to sustain a conviction.
Someone who disturbs a woman at three in the morning with a phone call
"snickered" at request that he stop calling complainant); State v. Gattis, 730 P.2d 497,
504 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (involving defendant who ignored repeated requests to stop
calling complainant).
80 The Chief Justice of the West Virginia Supreme Court argued this point with
particular clarity in his dissenting opinion in Thorne. The effect of the majority's decision
to construe the state's telephone harassment statute to apply to all repeated phone calls
made with an intent to harass, he explained:
would be to invite prosecution for any type of persistent telephone calls by persons
who have legitimate objectives in mind. Certainly, I cannot conceive that the
legislature intended to chill the right of our citizens to complain to a neighbor about
his barking dog or his loud stereo and make repeated calls if he is rebuffed. Nor
should he be fearful of repeatedly calling his landlord about the failure to correct
conditions or to a repairman or merchant who has made inadequate repairs or has
sold defective merchandise. A lethargic bureaucracy or business will hardly ever
respond to one telephone call. Even if the legislature so intended, it could not do
so under First Amendment principles.
State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817, 824-25 (W. Va. 1985) (Miller, C.J., dissenting).
8' Because of its nature and purpose, critical speech intended to change the listener's
behavior transcends the narrow category of targeted vilification. It is part of the domain
of persuasive, public discourse, at least when it is initially expressed, and as such it
receives stringent first amendment protection. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text;
see also infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
1994]
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
filled with vulgar sexual ravings may be guilty of harassment on the basis
of that call alone.
Such a restriction on speech is justified in the same way that
restrictions on repeated phone calls are justified. The critical point is that
the same factors that justify restricting speech in the context of repeated
phone calls can be demonstrated to exist in other situations. The single late
night sexually abusive phone call is determined to have little value as
expression and is understood to have a particularly powerful and harmful
impact on the recipient of the call. Furthermore, society recognizes
presumptively that this kind of communication is undesired. Women do not
have to inform each caller individually that they do not want to receive
this kind of communication. Telephone harassment statutes make that point
for all women as a preemptive assertion of their autonomy interest in not
being subjected to verbal abuse.
C. Analogizing Telephone Harassment at Home to Hate Speech on
Campus
Even if the constitutionality of telephone harassment statutes can be
persuasively defended and explained by using the multifactor analysis
proposed in Part I of this Article, the more general utility of this model is
not fully established. In particular, it remains to be determined whether this
analysis of telephone harassment can be extended to apply to the
regulation of hate speech at public universities. The most immediate
analogy seems easy to accept. A middle of the night phone call filled with
racial epithets to a black student in her dormitory room should constitute
harassment. That analogy is arguably limited in its scope, however, by the
especially disturbing time at which the call occurs, and, more importantly,
by the hate message being directed to the student's residence, the location
at which an individual's privacy interests are recognized by the case law
to be the most deserving of protection. 82
If we change these variables, however, a different analogy must be
considered. Assume a minority student, B, is followed around campus
during the day by another student, A, who continually chants racial
epithets at his victim, despite repeated requests from B that he does not
want to listen to A's speech. Surely that behavior constitutes actionable
harassment, despite the less problematic time and place in which it occurs,
for all the reasons that repeated annoying telephone calls are sanction-
able. 83 The speech is of limited value, it is extremely disturbing and
82 See Brownstein, supra note 26, at 48; Massey, supra note 3, at 176-77.
83 See generally Haiman, supra note 42, at 183-84, 193-94.
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harmful, and it violates the autonomy interest of the victim in B's not
being left alone as he requested.
The question then arises whether the restriction of continuous or
repeated insults can be extended to cover a single event, A walking up to
B and insulting him directly with racial epithets. I suggest that there is a
strong argument that it can. Remember that repeated expressive activity is
not some magic talisman that nullifies the force of the First Amendment.
Rather, repeated expressive activity constitutes unprotected harassment be-
cause of a multi-factor analysis that justifies restrictions on speech in that
circumstance. If a similar analysis applies with equal force in the different
circumstance of a single harassing event, speech should also be subject to
restrictions in that distinct context. Consider how the multi-factor analysis
applies to our example. When A walks up to B and insults him with racial
epithets, A is not engaging in public discourse. This is private expression
that requires B as a particular individual to be the recipient of A's hate
speech. Any claim that A's insults should be construed to be public
expression because A expects others to witness his expressive activity must
be categorically rejected. Whatever A's free speech rights may be, he has
no right to conscript B into participating in the communication of a
message to third parties against B's wishes. A cannot transform B's status
from the recipient of A's private speech into an unwilling actor in some
kind of public performance that A is orchestrating.84
Moreover, there is an additional, corollary, but equally important
privacy dimension to the hate speech that A directs toward B. Because A
is engaging in private discourse in a public setting, B's emotional response
to this verbal assault is exposed to public scrutiny. Certainly this aspect of
personal autonomy, the ability to control the exposure of one's deeply felt,
personal feelings, is as substantial a "privacy" interest as is the
protection of a safe location from expressive intrusions. Just as the open
display of obscene materials can invade the privacy of individuals by
forcing them to react to powerful stimulation under the eyes of others,85
the public but personalized use of hate speech violates core privacy
interests of the victim of such a verbal assault.86
14 The public harassment of a person does not become protected public discourse
because a crowd is invited to witness the speaker's taunts and the victim's discomfort.
85 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
86 Because the distinction between what is public and private for first amendment
purposes is slippery and multi-faceted, and because these terms have other, conventional
meanings, the words "public" and "private" must be used with considerable care.
Targeted ethnic insults constitute private discourse because they are addressed to a single
individual or small group, they are not intended to persuade the listener of their truth or
to change his behavior, and they do not involve matters of public concern. While these
insults may be expressed in a public setting and may abridge the listener's privacy
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The deliberate use of racial epithets to insult a person is high impact
speech for other reasons. Hate speech based on race or ethnicity or gender
is typically more hurtful and painful to the listener than are other types of
generic insults. The literature describing the experience of being victimized
by this kind of speech is extensive and convincing.87
The hurtful effect of targeted hate speech does not justify its pro-
hibition by itself, however. The impact of such speech and the privacy im-
plications of its expression in our example are only two of the relevant
factors to consider. We must also evaluate a third factor and argument.
Should the state wait to intervene until it is clear that B does not want to
hear what A has to say? If we wait until B makes it absolutely clear that
he does not want to continue to receive A's communications, and A's in-
sulting language is nonetheless repeated, then we mitigate the difficult
problem of identifying beforehand the precise speech that is to be prohib-
ited as harassment. B's autonomy interests, after all, include both the right
to be left alone and the right to decide what he or she is willing to hear.
Waiting until expression is repeated in defiance of B's insistence that
he be left alone is a useful check on overly zealous restraints on
expression. It is not clear that this is an essential element of an anti-
harassment policy, however. Certain comments are so obviously intended
to be communicated despite the listener's aversion to hearing them that it
makes no sense to insist that the speaker be properly informed that the
listener does not want to hear them again. As was true of the sexually
degrading phone call, some speech can be identified by its content and
'context as constituting harassment even by way of a single utterance. If
such a category of objectively unwanted expression exists, as the telephone
harassment cases suggest, surely it is self-evident that the insulting use of
racial epithets can also be classified as "speech directed primarily at those
who are presumptively unwilling to receive it. '"88
Despite the arguments above, the case for prohibiting A's hate speech
to B is not yet complete or convincing. Applying the factors already
discussed still makes it too easy to suppress unpleasant speech. The fact
remains that there is some insulting, demeaning, hurtful language that
deserves to be protected in its expression even though it is abundantly
interests because they force him to reveal personal emotions in a public location, neither
of these conditions change the nature of the speech from private to public discourse.
8 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 372 (1991); Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133
(1982); Charles Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech:
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989).
88 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988).
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clear that the person to whom it is directed will not want to hear it. If A
wants to castigate B using vulgar or insulting language because A believes
B is a bigot, or a liar, or a murderer of babies because she performs
abortions, it is difficult to contend that A does not have the right to tell B
at least once how angry A is at B's beliefs or conduct. The First
Amendment does not require that all speech be amiable and civil in order
to be protected against suppression.89
Hate speech, however, is different in a very fundamental way than the
insulting, critical speech that warrants first amendment protection even
when it is directed at a specific individual. Hate speech is particularly low
value speech, not because it is a manifestation of reprehensible ideas,
which it clearly is, but because it serves no purpose other than to cause
injury. Negative expression directed at voluntary behavior or a personal
characteristic that the individual can alter may have some claim to
legitimacy depending on the circumstances; but anger and hate directed at
a person because of immutable characteristics such as race or ethnicity
cannot be defended as an attempt to encourage the listener to change what
he does or what he believes. Such-expression may be satisfying to the
speaker, but it involves a form of self-gratification grounded on the harm
it causes to the person being spoken to and nothing else.
Recognizing the unique irrationality and worthlessness of this kind of
targeted hate speech has strong constitutional roots. Under conventional
equal protection doctrine, suspect classifications are defined in part by the
fact that they are based on immutable characteristics. 90 Immutability is a
relevant criterion for determining which classes should receive heightened
constitutional protection because it casts doubt on the reasonableness of the
state's interest in disadvantaging people who cannot change their status.
We can understand why the state burdens groups such as thieves and drug
dealers. The* state wants to encourage members of those groups to change
89
'9 See, e.g., People v. Klick, 362 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ill. 1977) (stating that "First
Amendment protection is not limited to amiable communications.").
90 See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1979) (affirming that "[racial
classifications must be assessed under the most stringent level of review because
immutable characteristics, which bear no relation to individual merit or need, are
irrelevant to almost every governmental decision."); Nyguist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 17-
18 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that a discreet and insular minority group,
"like Blacks or Orientals, is one identifiable by a status over which the members are
powerless"); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (stating that "the legal status
of illegitimacy ... is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes
not within the control of the illegitimate individual, and it bears no relation to the
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society."); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (stating that sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic).
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their behavior, and it wants to discourage nonmembers from joining these
burdened classes. It is much more difficult to explain why a class defined
by immutable characteristics, like race, should be deliberately and regularly
disadvantaged; hence the presumption that discriminatory racial
classifications are invidious or irrational.91
The same argument pertains to hate speech. The point is not that the
Equal Protection Clause requires public universities to prohibit hate
speech.92 It is that some of the same reasoning that explains why racially
discriminatory laws violate constitutional equality principles also helps to
explain and justify why certain kinds of hate speech may be suppressed.
Unlike other types of critical expression, hate speech directed at individual
members of a suspect class93 is uniquely valueless, irrational, and
undeserving of constitutional protection because it is focused on irrelevant
personal characteristics that the victim cannot change. Hate speech and
other kinds of expression that can be identified as actionable harassment
do not warrant this status because they communicate a noxious idea. Hate
speech is harassment because it is targeted expression that serves no
purpose other than the infliction of serious harm on its victims.94
D. Prohibiting Harassment and Judicial Balancing
Obviously, the narrow category of hate speech described above is not
the only expressive activity on a college campus that can constitute
harassment. Moreover, in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in
" See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 154-55 (1980). Of course,
some laws burdening the members of a class defined by an immutable characteristic are
rational, such as a regulation limiting the driving privileges of individuals with specific
physical disabilities. Immutability is only one factor that is relevant to identifying a
suspect class, and it is clearly not a sufficient basis for providing heightened equal
protection review. Presumably, a rational law limiting the opportunities of class members
with immutable disabilities would not be deliberately demeaning or punitive, however. A
law that punishes blind people or people with Alzheimer's disease would be as irrational
as expression that insults someone because of their race.
9 See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 26, at 23-47 (stating that the Equal Protection
Clause does not require public universities to prohibit hate speech except in limited
circumstances).
13 By suspect class, I mean any racial group, not simply a minority or disadvantaged
group. Under current equal protection doctrine, any group burdened by a racial
classification is, in a sense, a suspect class, and the racial classification will be reviewed
under strict scrutiny.
9" Viewed in this way, certain kinds of hate speech are not a part of public discourse
because the expression at issue is not intended to persuade the listener to change either
his beliefs or his behavior through the communication of a message. See supra note 83;
see also supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,95 it might be unconstitutional to prohibit only
hate speech harassment without restricting other forms of verbal
harassment as well. 96 If I am correct in my argument that some content
discrimination is intrinsic to the identification of verbal harassment, and
that verbal harassment can be restricted without violating first amendment
guarantees, then the R.A.V. decision should not preclude a university per
se from adopting a carefully defined prohibition against verbal harassment.
It should be clear, however, that such an undertaking today involves
substantial risks.
In R.A.V. the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance that
prohibited the display on public or private property of hate symbols, such
as a burning cross or a swastika, that are known to arouse "anger, alarm,
or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender."97 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowly construed the
challenged ordinance to apply only to "fighting words, ' 98 the United
States Supreme Court held that even a law directed exclusively at
unprotected expression may be unconstitutional if it involves impermissible
content discrimination in addition to the content discrimination inherent in
defining the relevant category of unprotected speech. 99 Thus, while an
ordinance prohibiting all fighting words will be upheld despite the fact that
the generic category of fighting words involves content discrimination, a
law prohibiting only political fighting words or racist fighting words will
be reviewed under strict scrutiny.00
In theory, if the Court was to accept the argument that verbal
harassment is a form of unprotected expression, an anti-harassment
regulation that included racial insults within its coverage should satisfy the
threshold requirements set out in R.A.V. in conceptual terms. Practical
problems in implementing the standard, however, may raise constitutional
concerns that would preclude this result. The problem is that verbal
harassment is defined in part by the low communicative value of the
speech being expressed. That is why repeated angry calls to one's landlord
to fix the furnace would not constitute harassment until some egregious
level of repetition and vulgarity was reached, while one disturbing,
95 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
96 See infra notes 97-121 and accompanying text.
9' R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541.
98 id.
99 Id. at 2542-47.
"o Id. at 2546 (arguing that a state may not prohibit only obscene speech that
communicates a political message).
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sexually graphic call to a stranger might be the basis of a successful
telephone harassment prosecution.10
A limitation of this kind is hardly unique in defining a category of
unprotected speech. Obscene expression must lack "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value"'' 0 2 and fighting words are defined in
part as being "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality."'0 3 A requirement of this kind is also
intrinsically subjective, however, and it creates significant risks that
prohibiting particular unprotected speech might involve the suppression of
unpopular ideas, the very result that the Court in R.A.V. seemed
determined to avoid.' °4
This risk is mitigated with regard to a category of unprotected speech
like obscenity which includes other narrow and relatively rigorous
elements that effectively limit the scope of what might be held to be
obscene.0 5 Categories of unprotected speech such as fighting words or
verbal harassment, however, have more indefinite parameters that focus on
the effect of speech on the audience and are much more vulnerable to
unconstitutional manipulation. Indeed, the Court's general unwillingness
to employ the fighting words doctrine to sustain convictions and uphold
statutes may reflect its concern that such an indeterminate category of
unprotected speech may be misused to justify the suppression of unpopular
'1' See supra notes 31-32, 67-82 and accompanying text.
102 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
103 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
"o Whatever lack of clarity there may be in the Court's general reasoning in R.A.V.,,
Justice Scalia's analysis is totally unambiguous on this point. Scalia is primarily
concerned that the "selectivity of the restriction" of a regulation may be conditioned on
whether the government agrees with what the speaker has to say. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at
2547. Thus, he recognizes that even content discrimination within a category of
unprotected speech may be valid "so long as the nature of the content discrimination is
such that there is no realistic possibility that the official suppression of ideas is afoot."
Id.
While there is an important distinction between restricting speech because it lacks
communicative value and restricting speech because the government disagrees with the
message being conveyed, it is a distinction that is acutely vulnerable to manipulation.
Obviously, racist insults might be prohibited not because they lack communicative value,
but because they deliver a message of hate and intolerance that deserves to be suppressed.
Given Justice Scalia's expressed concern regarding any "realistic possibility that the
official suppression of ideas" may be motivating speech restrictions, there is little doubt
that he would consider this aspect of the definition of verbal harassment to be conducive
to the kind of content discrimination that the First Amendment forbids.
"' The requirement that obscene material must be patently offensive, for example, has
been interpreted to apply exclusively to graphic, hard core depictions of sexual conduct.
See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
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messages. 6 Given the reaffirmation of this concern in R.A.V., 117 it is
arguably unlikely that the Court will accept a new category of unprotected
speech that magnifies this possibility. It is also difficult to believe,
however, that the Court is committed to a first amendment doctrine that
prevents states from punishing verbal harassment and requires the
invalidation of most telephone harassment statutes.
Even if verbal harassment, the deliberate violation of the privacy and
autonomy interests of individuals through targeted verbal assaults that
serve no legitimate communicative purpose, is recognized as unprotected
speech, the R.A.V. decision may preclude universities from specifically
identifying the use of racial insults as harassment. A regulatory
presumption that racial insults constitute harassment is a form of content
discrimination, but the R.A.V. opinion does not require the invalidation of
all discriminatory restrictions on expression. Content discrimination within
a category of unprotected expression is permissible "[w]hen the basis for
the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire
class of speech at issue is proscribable."'' 0 8 Thus, the Court explains, a
state may elect to prohibit only the most prurient obscenity, but it could
not prohibit only politically oriented obscenity."9
The utility of this exception for anti-harassment codes is uncertain
since the examples in the R.A.V. opinion do not provide a complete picture
of the possible regulatory options that might fall within its coverage.
Obscene expression is defined by three requirements of which prurience
106 In Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), the Court reversed the conviction
of a woman who had been convicted of cursing a police officer to his face on the grounds
that the ordinance under which she was charged was overbroad and not limited to actual
fighting words. Justice Powell, in his concurrence, further justified the Court's decision
by explaining that the challenged ordinance conferred on the police "a -virtually
unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation." Id. at 135.
In City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987), the Court held that a law making it
unlawful to "oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his
duty" was substantially overbroad and invalid. Id. at 451. While the Court sug-
gested that an ordinance strictly limited to the prohibition of fighting words might be
sustained, id. at 464 n.12, it also pointedly noted that "[t]he freedom of individuals
verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the
principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state." Id.
at 462-63.
107 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548-49 (condemning as "word-play" the argument that a
prohibition of hate speech that constitutes fighting words is not directed at the invidious
messages conveyed by hate speech, but at the unique harm such expression causes its
victims).
0 Id. at 2545.
109 Id. at 2546.
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is only one." ° It is unclear whether the Court is defining this aspect of
obscene expression as the critical rationale that justifies its unprotected
status, or whether the state may discriminate with regard to the other
requirements as well. May a state, for example, only prohibit the most
sexually graphic obscene material without violating the First Amendment?
More importantly, may a state decide to prohibit only that obscene
expression which is particularly lacking in literary, artistic, political or
scientific value? If the latter discriminatory regulation of obscene
expression is permissible, then, by analogy, racial insults may be isolated
and restricted as harassment since they are a type of derogatory speech that
is uniquely irrelevant to any legitimate, albeit negative, communicative
message.
If the R.A.V. decision does not support this degree of flexibility in
determining what are justifiable grounds for discriminating within a
"o In addition to appealing to the prurient interest of the viewer, obscene expression
must depict or describe sexual conduct in a "patently offensive way" and it must lack
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973).
... As the discussion in supra note 104 suggests, this argument is unlikely to prove
persuasive to Justice Scalia or the other Justices who joined his opinion in RAY. In
explaining his contention that a state may prohibit only the most prurient forms of
obscenity without having its statute strictly scrutinized, Scalia implicitly requires a content
discriminatory regulation of this kind to meet two requirements, not just one. The basis
for the content discrimination must be the reason the class of speech is "proscribable,"
and the viewpoint discrimination must not create a "significant danger of idea or content
discrimination." R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545. Scalia obviously believes that prurience is
a sufficiently neutral enough form of content discrimination that it is unlikely to mask the
suppression of ideas. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545-46. It is far less clear that identifying
speech that is uniquely lacking in communicative value is an equally "safe" standard.
The Court's concern about the suppression of ideas is not entirely misplaced. Still, a
judicial refusal to allow states to choose for themselves whether or not "proscribable"
speech is so valueless that it must be prohibited, intrusively subordinates the legislature's
judgment to the Court's value choices. If a state legislature concludes that much of what
the Court deems to be lacking in literary, artistic, political, or scientific value is legitimate
expression of real worth, it is unclear after R.A.V. how that different perspective can be
manifested as law.
A statute that only prohibits certain obscene expression that the legislature believes to
be without value while permitting the distribution of other sexually graphic material must
involve content discrimination. Moreover, content discrimination based on the
communicative value of expression risks manipulation, misuse, and the suppression of
ideas. If the legislature is denied the power to enforce such a statute, however, it must
either prohibit all the expression the Court would find to be obscene regardless of the
legislature's contrary judgment as to the value of the expression, or it must allow all
obscene material to be distributed in the community it governs. It is difficult to accept that
the First Amendment leaves legislatures with no option other than these two inadequate
alternatives.
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category of unprotected expression, an anti-harassment regulation singling
out racial insults as presumptively invalid or worthy of special sanction
would receive strict scrutiny.' 2 Again, this should not mean that the
regulation is necessarily unconstitutional. The argument that content
discrimination of this kind should withstand even rigorous review has
already been discussed. Unlike other abusive speech, racial insults and
other degrading comments directed at an immutable characteristic that the
victim can not change are presumptively valueless because they cannot be
justified as an attempt to change the listener's behavior.3
This contention, however, may also be difficult to reconcile with the
reasoning and holding of R.A.V. A similar argument by St. Paul, that its
hate speech ordinance served the compelling interest of protecting the right
of members of victimized groups to live in peace, was rejected by the
Court on the ground that the challenged law was too imprecisely tailored
to satisfy strict scrutiny."14 While St. Paul's goals were clearly compelling,
the Court saw no reason why a content discriminatory ordinance that
singled out hate speech was necessary to further its objective. A content
discriminatory ban on only certain unprotected messages, but not others,
cannot withstand rigorous scrutiny, the Court concluded, because the
state's compelling interests can always be adequately furthered by a more
content neutral alternative. Thus, since a general ban on all fighting words
effectively protects the victims of racist fighting words without engaging
in additional content discrimination, the adoption of a law prohibiting only
racist fighting words could not be justified. A statute prohibiting all
fighting words would allow the state to prosecute unprotected hate speech
just as vigorously as St. Paul's ordinance." 5
The flaw in this analysis is that it places far too much faith in the
utility of the Court's doctrinal descriptions of unprotected expression. It
assumes that an ordinance generally prohibiting an entire category of
unprotected speech, a law prohibiting all fighting words, for example, does
not jeopardize first amendment guarantees. But the fact that a doctrinal
category may effectively serve the purposes of judicial review does not
mean that the same category should be enacted as a statutory standard. Nor
is there any reason to believe that the Court's determination of the
constitutional limits on state authority to restrict expression should
correspond with the conclusions of any legislature with regard to the need
to suppress speech in a particular community. Indeed, the Court's
12 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549-50 (stating that a content discriminatory regulation will
be upheld if it meets strict scrutiny).
13 See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
"4 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549-50.
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definitions of unprotected speech may often be broader than necessary to
meet a state's regulatory conces '16 and are almost certainly too vague to
be tolerated as a statutory standard.' 7 Thus, under the R.A.V. framework,
a state that believes that some sub-category of unprotected speech deserves
to be prohibited is encouraged to prohibit the entire category of speech and
to use language in doing so that will almost certainly chill the expression
of fully protected speech.
The problematic consequences of a literal commitment to the reasoning
of R.A.V. can be demonstrated by the difficulties it creates for a university
attempting to draft a constitutional anti-harassment regulation. Officials
might conclude, for example, under the authority of R.A.V., that the only
verbal harassment that may be constitutionally restricted must be more
broadly defined than this Article suggests. In order to satisfy the Court's
concerns that harassment rules would be used illicitly to punish the ex-
pression of unpopular ideas, the university might try to limit the definition
116 The state may conclude that not all of the expression covered by the Court's
categories of unprotected speech deserve to be suppressed. Thus, a state may believe that
some sexually graphic expression appealing to the viewer's prurient interest is tolerable
even though this material may technically be obscene under the Court's definition of
obscenity. See supra note 111.
17 See TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1030-3 1. Tribe uses the example of a law that
prohibits all public speech "unless the speech is protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments" (italics omitted) to prove his point that constitutional rules cannot always
be employed as a statutory standard because they are often unacceptably vague. Id. Put
simply, "the Constitution does not, in and of itself, provide a bright enough line to guide
primary conduct." Id.
Vague standards, of course, are not simply unfair because they do not provide regulated
persons adequate notice of what they are prohibited from saying. A vague restriction on
expression constitutes an impermissible burden on freedom of speech because its
uncertainty of application will deter or chill protected expression. This burden is the price
the Court seems willing to pay to avoid content discriminatory regulations that selectively
prohibit unprotected speech. It is not clear, however, that the benefits of this approach
outweigh its costs.
If the Court tolerates content or viewpoint discrimination within a category of
unprotected speech, the impact on freedom of speech is limited in a basic sense. The
speech that is prohibited by such a law did not merit full first amendment protection. It
could have been banned by a more general law. If, as the RAY. decision suggests, the
Court will now tolerate broad statutory restrictions on speech that incorporate the Court's
definition of a category of unprotected expression, the impact of that decision will be
different and arguably far more damaging to freedom of speech. Such vague definitional
categories will deter protected expression of recognized value that could not be directly
suppressed. A law prohibiting only certain kinds of fighting words, clearly defined by
their content, only burdens unprotected speech. A law prohibiting fighting words in
general, with all of the indeterminacy such a statutory rule entails, creates a substantial
risk that fully protected speech will be chilled.
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of what constitutes verbal harassment to neutral descriptions of personal
epithets and abusive speech.
It is difficult to understand the advantages of this approach. A basic
civility statute of this kind may conform to the spirit of the R.A.V. decision
in the sense that it does not involve any secondary content discrimination.
The regulation's drawback is that it risks blanketing discourse in the com-
munity with a vague and chilling cloak of mandated gentility that unreas-
onably smothers the legitimate passion of angry expressive interactions. "8
18 The difficulty with rigorous civility regulations is that they disable speakers from
expressing their anger in circumstances that justify verbal responses of outrage. If a
speaker states that he thinks it was a good thing that one million Jewish children were
murdered during the Holocaust, it is not clear, at least to me, why that speaker should be
protected from a moderately intemperate verbal reaction. Hate speech regulations
protecting individuals against racial or ethnic insults, unlike general civility statutes, would
not prohibit strong verbal reactions to political expression.
Contrary to the above analysis, the majority opinion in R.A.V. condemns as viewpoint
discrimination any regulatory regime that prohibits racial insults without imposing
comparable restrictions on insults directed at persons engaged in racist behavior.
According to Justice Scalia's interpretation of such hate speech codes, the state has no
constitutional authority "to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring
the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules." R.A.V. 112 S. Ct. at 2548. One may
share Scalia's aversion to viewpoint discrimination, however, without accepting his
contention that the hate speech regulations at issue in R.A.V., or those discussed in this
Article, involve discrimination of this kind. Indeed, Scalia's failure to recognize that many
hate speech codes are not viewpoint discriminatory in the very context that he describes
reflects a critical weakness of his analysis in the R.A.V. decision.
Insults directed at a person's race and insults directed at a person's bigoted beliefs
simply do not reflect opposing positions on a debate continuum. Rather, they are distinct
subjects of discourse. The former expression is directed at an individual's ethnic
background, the latter is directed at an individual's political and social opinions. Tolerance
and bigotry may be competing viewpoints and it would constitute impermissible viewpoint
discrimination to prohibit insults directed at a person preaching racial harmony while
permitting insults to be directed a person promoting bigotry. But there is no comparable
sense in which ethnic insults constitute one side of an argument and criticisms of bigotry
constitute the opposing viewpoint. A rule that prohibits insults based on the victims race
while permitting insults based on the victim's political beliefs is viewpoint neutral if it
applies to all races and all political beliefs. It does involve content discrimination, but
content distinctions within a category of unprotected speech can be justified far more
easily than viewpoint discrimination.
Indeed, if it is understood in this way, a content discriminatory rule prohibiting racial
insults while tolerating harshly critical speech directed at a speaker's political opponents
arguably affirms basic first amendment principles more than it undermines them. Hurtful,
critical speech directea at the clearly mutable characteristic of the listener's political
beliefs and conduct serves the primary first amendment value of using speech to persuade
the listener to change his attitudes and behavior. A university committed to free speech
values might reasonably try to avoid suppressing such persuasive speech, even when it is
expressed at some moderate level of intemperance, out of fear of chilling vigorous debate.
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Nor can this risk be mitigated by restricting the application of the regula-
tion to insulting expression that serves no legitimate purpose. The inherent
vagueness and chilling quality of that amendment cannot cure the vague-
ness and chilling effect of the underlying restrictions. " 9 Ultimately, unless
an anti-harassment regulation can identify harassing expression by its con-
tent to some extent, it will be difficult to draft a university code that is not
unreasonably vague in its language and unreasonably broad in its effect. 20
Abusive speech directed at a person's race, ethnicity, color, or gender, on the other hand,
constitutes uniquely valueless fighting words for first amendment purposes because the
victim is targeted and abused on account of her immutable characteristics that she cannot
change. The speaker's only objective is to achieve self-gratification by causing harm, a
goal that surely rests at the very lowest level of the purposes that the First Amendment
serves to the extent that it is recognized as a first amendment value at all.
"9 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
'20 The R.A.V. opinion does suggest one other type of hate speech regulation that might
be consistent with first amendment guarantees, "a prohibition of fighting words that are
directed at 'certain persons or groups (which would be facially valid if it met the
requirements of the Equal Protection Clause)." RAY., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. While this
vague language is susceptible to multiple interpretations, it is difficult to understand how
any regulation focused on groups, not the content of speech, can bridge the gap between
the goals of hate speech regulations and the reasoning of R.A.V.
One possible reading of this part of the R.A.V. opinion suggests that the Court would
approve a hate speech ordinance patterned after conventional hate crimes statutes, see,
e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). Such a law would only punish, or
enhance the punishment for, the expression of fighting words whenever the"speaker selects
the person to whom the fighting words are addressed on account of that person's race or
ethnic background.
A hate speech regulation of this kind would effectively serve the objective of
suppressing hate speech, but it would fundamentally undermine the holding of RAY.
Since in almost all cases, prosecutors and courts could only establish that the victim of
fighting words had been selected for abuse on account of his race by examining the
specific words that the speaker expressed, this group focused regulation would end up
prohibitingthe same speech in the same circumstances as the law struck down in RAY.
It is difficult to believe that the majority in RAY. intended to permit, or would accept,
this facile circumvention of the first amendment principles that they so aggressively
endorsed throughout the opinion.
Alternatively, the Court may have been thinking about laws that do not focus on the
reason why fighting words are directed at a particular victim, but that focus more simply
and exclusively on the identity of the victim himself. Thus, a hate speech regulation,
compatible with first amendment guarantees, would prohibit anyone from directing
fighting words of any kind at a specific class of victims, African-Americans, or the
elderly, for example. The problem with this approach is that it allows states to protect
only those groups that might be the victims of fighting Iwords that are not defined by
suspect classifications.
A law prohibiting only those fighting words directed at African-Americans, for
example, employs a racial classification. Accordingly, it will be reviewed under strict
scrutiny and almost certainly struck down as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
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As a last alternative, a university might adopt more formal and less
content based anti-harassment requirements. Verbal harassment might only
be prohibited once the victim has explicitly indicated that he does not wish
to receive any further communications from the speaker, or some more
egregious invasion of privacy may be required than provoking someone
into the display of deeply personal emotions. Each factor identified above
as relevant to a multi-factor constitutional analysis may be interpreted and
applied in a way that provides more protection to the abusive speaker and
less protection to his target. This approach maximizes first amendment
values at the cost of substantially limiting the utility of the regulation. By
analogy, many telephone harassment statutes would be unconstitutional
under this framework and a significant part of what is currently recognized
as telephone harassment could no longer be constitutionally punished.' 2'
Given the unprecedented and ambiguous nature of the R.A.V. decision,
it is impossible to give university officials any real confidence that a parti-
cular hate speech/harassment regulation will withstand constitutional
challenge. All that can be said with assurance is that the analytic formula
described in the R.A.V. opinion creates a realm of constitutional uncertainty
that seems out of touch with many commonly accepted real world restric-
tions on expressive activity. If R.A.V. is read broadly, far less controversial
speech restrictions than hate speech statutes are now in jeopardy.
The problem of targeted abusive speech directed at specific victims can
only be resolved through a multi-factor analysis. This issue cannot be
adequately addressed by invoking basic first amendment doctrine pro-
hibiting content discrimination. 22 The argument that all abusive speech
Moreover, there is no way to generalize this regulation while maintaining its specific
focus. A law that protects both blacks and whites or men and women from fighting words
protects everyone. It is simply a cumbersome way to ban all fighting words.
Thus, under this alternative interpretation of the group protection exception to the
holding of RAY., states might successfully prohibit fighting words directed at gays, the
mentally retarded, the elderly, and the poor because none of these groups are defined by
suspect classifications under current equal protection doctrine. The use of age or wealth
classification in a fighting words prohibition, for example, will receive highly deferential,
minimum rationality review. Laws protecting African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians, or
women against fighting words, on the other hand, would receive some form of rigorous
review and be struck down as unconstitutional, despite the obvious fact that the members
of these latter groups may be most in need of the protection that hate speech regulations
provide.
121 Many telephone harassment statutes are not restricted to calls to the victim's home.
See supra note 66. Many statutes are also not content neutral and describe the kinds of
calls that are prohibited. See supra note 75.
122 The non-content based variables of location, repetition, and the refusal to honor
requests to end the expressive activity are all relevant factors to consider. Any rule based
exclusively on such factors, however, must suffer from one of two defects. Either it will
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must be permitted unless it falls within a traditional category of un-
protected speech-fighting words or obscenity-is similarly unacceptable.'23
These categorical principles simply do not provide an effective framework
for evaluating the regulation of verbal harassment. If the R.A.V. decision
is inconsistent with this analysis, it must be marginally modified to
accommodate reasonable regulatory restrictions on this kind of speech.
Similarly, it is not enough to insist that locational privacy interests
alone are of sufficient importance to justify restrictions on abusive speech.
Affirming the exclusive primacy .of privacy in this regard, among all the
personal interests that may be injured by targeted hate speech, cannot be
defended as a self evident truth or as an essential pre-condition of
democratic self government or personal dignity. Other value choices are
possible and need to be considered and comparatively evaluated. Indeed,
the very idea of privacy itself includes a range of interests deserving of
respect that extends beyond the protection of the locational sanctuary of
the home.
There is no alternative to a multi-factor analysis. If verbal harassment
is to be coherently defined and regulated, speech has to be evaluated as to
its content, its purpose, its impact, and in terms of the circumstances in
which it occurs. The First Amendment is not weakened if courts
forthrightly engage in this undertaking. Indeed, the converse is the case.
If courts and commentators refuse to engage in the balancing of competing
values that is required to resolve the problem of hate speech harassment,
they cannot persuasively defend their conclusions on this issue as an
impartial and consistent application of first amendment doctrine.
IV. CONCLUSION
Targeted, abusive expression in the form of harassment is currently
restricted by most states in particular circumstances. If those restrictions
are carefully drafted, they are commonly and correctly upheld against
constitutional challenge. Courts have considerable difficulty, however, in
explaining why the prohibition of telephone harassment, for example, is
consistent with first amendment guarantees.
I suggest that there is a principled basis for upholding these restrictions
on speech, but it involves a complex, multi-factor analysis. To uphold the
tolerate too much hurtful and purposeless speech in an effort to provide sufficient
opportunity for legitimate, critical expression, or it will restrict speech too much,
sacrificing opportunities for legitimate critical expression in order to provide adequate
protection against abusive verbal harassment. See supra notes 59-92 and accompanying
text.
23 See supra notes 14-17, 19-21, 32, 57-58 and accompanying text.
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prohibition of targeted expressive conduct as harassment, courts must
determine that the speech at issue is of a uniquely low value, that it causes
significant harm, and .that it violates the autonomy interests of the victim.
Uniquely low value speech includes expression that serves no purpose
other than to inflict unreasonable harm.
The determination that a violation of personal autonomy has occurred,
in turn, requires an analysis of two overlapping factors. For a speaker's
interference with personal autonomy interests to be of sufficient value to
outweigh freedom of speech, it must involve the deliberate subjugation of
the victim's right not to hear what the speaker has to say and a substantial
invasion of the victim's privacy. Invasions of privacy occur when targeted,
abusive speech 124 intrudes into "private" locations, such as one's home,
or when it compels an individual to expose deeply felt, "private" feelings
in a public setting.
Taken together and on balance, these factors justify the prohibition of
various forms of harassment. One such act of sanctionable harassment
involves the deliberate use of racial epithets by one student to insult
another on a college campus.
124 The requirement that only "targeted abusive speech" may be restricted eliminates
any concerns that we may deprive other individuals of the right to decide whether they
want to hear what the speaker has to say by protecting the harassed victim of unwanted
expression.
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